No algorithms. No content filters. No A.I. — Honest and insightful analysis from Richmond, VA.
The second preliminary draft of the city’s after action report on the water plant failure was released Monday morning and like any good conundrum, this draft seems to pose more questions than it answers. That will set the stage and heighten the suspense for the delivery of the final “detailed” report due by April 1st, but this issue will just focus on the power failure and the lack of communication.
The report by third party firm HNTB reinforced what we already knew from the release of the city’s preliminary report on February 13th and the Henrico after action report on February 11th — the city was woefully unprepared and when it went sideways, didn’t tell anyone why they tried to get the problem — that never should have occurred — resolved.
The report said "a power outage is a scenario that the WTP (Water Treatment Plant) should be equipped to handle." In addition, it noted, “Management should have alerted all staff working during the storm about the potentially disruptive nature of the incoming storm and reminded staff of emergency operating procedures.”
Except we know from the 1st draft of the report that on the morning of January 6th, there were no emergency operating procedures or even standard operational procedures. There was not enough staff or expertise at the water plant, there was insufficient preparation for the storm event (even though the Mayor and Governor had both declared a state of emergency), and there was poor communication both inside the plant and outside to our regional partners and customers.
While it may read like a Shakespeare tragic comedy, there is nothing funny about it. On stage is the legacy of the rudderless leadership from the former Director of Public Utilities, the former Mayor and the former Chief Administrative Officer who left the water plant (among other things) drifting right into an iceberg just as Mayor Avula took over the ship.
We already knew from the 1st draft that there were not enough staff on the morning of the power failure which led to the plant flooding and failure. The more recent 2nd draft report indicated that in addition to the lack of the above, two mechanical staffers were scheduled to be at the water plant overnight to help remove snow but one “went home early.”
The water plant has three power sources: Dominion provides a primary and secondary feed from two separate sources, plus there are back up generators, and battery power. The primary power went out that morning at 5:45am, and the report indicates an electrician arrived at 6:00am for their shift and tried to manually restore the power from the primary to secondary feed by “making the manual switch to the secondary power feed that the switchgear had failed to complete.”
(This is the same switchgear that Samuel Parker reported in the RTD the city has been trying to replace for eight years; it would have automatically switched the power feed from the primary to secondary Dominion feed source).
The great mystery seems to be the role of the generators and why they were not utilized to provide power until the main feed was restored. The report confirmed that staff fueled the back up generators and were “verified to be operational by staff during a pre-storm check on January 4.” The report also noted that staff made “no attempts … to start the backup generators” after the power went out January 6th and it remains unclear if anyone on site could have even done so manually.
“Only the electrical staff are trained and able to perform the transfer to generator power, so there was not a qualified individual on site to switch to diesel-fueled generator power in the event of a power outage,” the report said.
Further, the report also stated interviews with staff revealed that they received different answers as to how long it would have taken to activate the generators had anyone been there that was qualified to do so, “ranging from 5 minutes to 45 minutes. That is critical because we know from reporting and the 1st draft of the report that the battery power lasted 45 minutes before expiring and the real meltdown began.
The report veers into CYA mode by claiming the focus on switching to the secondary power feed instead of firing up the generators to provide temporary power was the “prudent course of action,” and it could have been done faster than switching on the generators.
However, Graham Moomaw at The Richmonder reported that HNTB noted at a press conference Monday the training and expertise of those on staff at the time is still
Keep reading with a 7-day free trial
Subscribe to RVA 5x5 to keep reading this post and get 7 days of free access to the full post archives.